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Abstract 
The objectives of this paper are to  ascertain and assess the role of the 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC)  in Maltese public  finance, 
analyzing its operational effectiveness and the barriers to it, and 
assessing  its relationships with major stakeholders.   The research 
methodology  involves  the conduct of nineteen semi-structured 
interviews, attendance to one PAC sitting, a review of applicable PAC 
transcripts, and an examination of relevant legislative pieces 
governing the PAC.  The study   finds that PAC is fulfilling a wide 
proportion of its remit, recently exercising an improved role.  
However, the reoccurrence of errors and weaknesses within the 
public sector highlights the need for the Committee to investigate 
further  areas falling within its scope, thus acting as a deterrent to the 
misuse of public funds. Additionally, improvements in the PAC’s 
operational effectiveness are called for, particularly with regard to its 
structure and member composition, as well as its communication of 
end results and follow-ups. The appointment and participation of 
technical expertise in PAC meetings, and the widening of the PAC’s 
mandate to incorporate broader topics would also be conducive to 
enhanced effectiveness. In addition, while the Committee’s 
relationships with its major stakeholders are deemed positive, it is 
evident that there is still room for improvement.  The PAC is 
instrumental in the conduct of effective financial scrutiny and 
oversight, which in turn enhances its contribution to the proper 
management of Maltese public finances. Yet, achieving a strong impact 
may be restricted by the existence of barriers that are impeding the 
Committee’s operational effectiveness. While the surmounting of such 
obstacles becomes highly relevant for the PAC to retain its watchdog 
function, the maintenance of effective relationships with its main 
stakeholders is also necessary if it is to make the most of such links. It 
is hoped that this paper contributes to +further progress in the PAC’s 
operations and in the public sector’s use of public resources. 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), value 
for money (VFM), transparency, and accountability in the usage of public moneys have been 
recognised as three essential constituents of a democratic system of Government (OECD, 
2002). In this context, the principal responsibility rests with the institution of Parliament 
(Yamamoto, 2007) and its Parliamentary Committees, both having a vital role to play as 
watchdogs of the Executive, namely in holding the Executive to account while curbing 
corruption and the misuse of public funds (Global Partners Governance, GPG, 2013a). 
Indeed, Public Accounts Committees (PACs) are thought to be of paramount importance due 
to their powerful position and meaningful role in promoting good governance and oversight, 
and in ensuring accountability from a democratic and a Parliamentary point of view (Jacobs, 
Jones, and Smith, 2007; Hedger and Blick, 2008; Jacobs and Jones, 2009). 
Th objectives of this paper are to  ascertain and assess the role of the Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC)  in Maltese public  finance, analyzing its operational effectiveness and the 
barriers to it, and assessing  its relationships with major stakeholders.    
The rest of the paper will be as  follows: Section will review the relevant literature, while 
Section 3 will lay out the research methodology. This will be followed by Section 4 which will 
present the findings and discussion thereon. Section 6 will then conclude the  paper.   
2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The  Role of the PAC 
“Within most Commonwealth countries the PAC formally plays the lead role in holding 
Government to account for public expenditure, and in some countries it is effective in practice.” 
(Hedger and Blick, 2008, p. 32) 
Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010) pointed out that the PAC’s role is to ensure that Government 
Departments and agencies answer for the allocation of public resources. In agreement, 
Watson (2004) attested that the PAC’s duty is to guarantee effective employment of public 
money, with such an obligation being directed towards both Parliament and the electorate. 
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Moreover, this Committee is a means of overseeing public accountability, financial scrutiny 
and good governance (Jacobs, 2012), as well as improving transparency and consequently 
reducing the possibility of corruption (Wehner, 2003). Therefore the PAC is not only 
designed to safeguard the “accountability of the Executive arm of Government”, but also to 
instigate “improvements in public internal financial control and service efficiency” (Hedger 
and Blick, 2008, p. 26). 
Having originated from a Westminster system of governance, the Committee deals with the 
ex-post oversight function as opposed to ex-ante scrutiny (Wehner, 2003; Hedger and Blick, 
2008). That is, rather than evaluating the estimates outlined in the budget and presented to 
Parliament (Jacobs, 2012), the Committee’s purpose is to examine public expenditure 
(Hedger and Blick, 2008). In this context, a PAC would be effective if it manages to influence 
“future budgets and policy” (Jacobs, 2012, p. 6). 
In Malta, the PAC is mandated to examine and inquire into reports, accounts, and related 
matters as referred to it by the Auditor General, a Minister, or the House of Representatives 
(HoR). The Committee is also empowered to demand the Auditor General to undertake and 
issue memoranda as requested by three members of the Committee, as well as to report to 
Parliament, among other roles (Standing Orders, SOs, of the HoR: Art. 120E). Moreover, the 
enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Act (Cap.534) in 2014 has broadened the PAC’s remit 
to incorporate the operations of the Fiscal Council. 
Historically, the first PAC was established “to examine the accounts showing the 
appropriation of sums granted by Parliament to meet the public expenditure” (Jacobs and 
Jones, 2009, p. 15). However, the Committee’s role changed considerably throughout the 
years in order to meet the new complex arrangements that make up modern Governments 
(Leigh, 2007). 
A case in point is the New Public Management (NPM) reform that took place in the public 
sector. NPM attempted to address the public sector’s inability to perform its functions 
efficiently and effectively (Barton, 2006; Almquist et al., 2013). It also sought to adjust the 
insufficient type of accountability that was utilised at the time (Hughes, 2003). Such “big 
paradigm shifts” (Almquist et al., 2013, p. 480) have altered the understanding of the public 
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sector (Degeling, Anderson, and Guthrie, 1996) and, accordingly, its inherent features of 
accounting and accountability (Shaoul, Stafford, and Stapleton, 2012). 
Indeed, public accountability has evolved considerably throughout the years (Iyoha and 
Oyerinde, 2010), and at present the term is being used interchangeably to refer to other 
notions such as control (Mulgan, 2000), responsibility, responsiveness (Peters, 2006), and 
transparency (Kamuf, 2007). It has developed in a way that does not merely encompass 
external scrutiny, thus rendering it an “ever-expanding concept” (Mulgan, 2000). 
In addition to such new accountability arrangements, Hedger and Blick (2008) mentioned 
other aspects that contributed to changes in the Committee’s roles, and which further 
departed PACs from the original Westminster model. These include the diverging models of 
“multi-party politics” and the evolution of “presidential systems of Government”, among others 
(Hedger and Blick, 2008, p. 1). On the other hand, Leigh (2007) argued that the Westminster 
model itself underwent changes in its roles, particularly because of the privatisation of state-
owned sectors and the establishment of new regulatory frameworks. 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned changes, several components of Commonwealth 
PACs tend to remain unchanged (Wehner, 2003; Jones and Jacobs, 2006). In fact, the 
principal tasks of today’s PACs still correspond to those of past Committees (Leigh, 2007). 
The principle of policy neutrality requires PACs not to address and question the political 
reasoning behind certain policies (Wehner, 2002, 2003; Gauci Scicluna, 2004; Jacobs, Jones, 
and Smith, 2010). In other words, the Committee is not authorised to look into the 
Government’s formulation of policies (Watson, 2004; Jones and Jacobs, 2006); instead, it 
must ascertain that the spending of public monies succeeds in the realisation of such policies 
(Wehner, 2002) and in the accomplishment of VFM (Hedger and Blick, 2008; Jacobs, 2012). 
According to Adonis (1993, p. 184), the concepts of “economy, efficiency and effectiveness” 
form a significant part of the PAC’s responsibility, since it is in view of such principles that 
public interests can be given priority in the disbursement of public funds. Indeed, VFM 
scrutiny and reporting were introduced in the process of oversight, and have become a 
prominent part of the PAC’s roles (Mayston, 1993; Leigh, 2007). 
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Furthermore, such Committees should strive to remain autonomous from, unbiased 
towards, and unrelated to any political party (Hedger and Blick, 2008). Thus, the PAC must 
maintain a non-partisan nature if it is to function credibly. Otherwise, political affiliation 
would challenge and even endanger the Committee’s work and the entire audit system 
(Wehner, 2003). 
2.2  The PAC’s Operational Effectiveness and the Barriers to It 
Scrutiny Committees can only achieve their purpose if conceded the necessary powers by 
Parliament through their legal mandate. These powers formulate the processes that such 
Committees are to follow in conducting their investigations (GPG, 2013a), with such 
processes usually taking the form of enquiries (Smith, 2014). GPG (2013a) provided Figure 
1, outlining the typical structure of a Scrutiny Committee enquiry, which however tends to 
vary across different Parliaments. 
As argued by Loney (2004), while Parliament should have the ability to refer subjects to the 
PAC’s attention and scrutiny, the PAC should be empowered to pursue its own investigations 
without being unduly restricted to obtaining a reference from the Executive or from 
Parliament itself. This is critical if the PAC is to operate without actual or perceived external 
interference. 
Commonly, the process of a PAC enquiry starts with a report from the National Audit Office 
(NAO), and then proceeds to PAC hearings, these being the chief instrument by which such 
reports can be scrutinised properly by the Committee (Wehner, 2003). Loney (2004) 
emphasised the importance of reinforcing the PAC’s investigative powers with statutory 
powers, enabling the Committee to request the production of reports or documents as well 
as send for witnesses.1 Yamamoto (2007) concurred with this view, arguing that such 
powers enable the PAC to perform its oversight function effectively. Indeed, the PAC gathers 
evidence by summoning Public Officials from agencies or departments (Wehner, 2003), or 
other parties external to Parliament (GPG, 2013a). 
                                                          
1 In Malta, such powers emanate from the SOs of the HoR. 
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Source: GPG (2013a) 
Figure 1  - Typical Structure of a Scrutiny Committee Enquiry 
In Malta, it is customary for the Permanent Secretary, Heads of Departments, and other 
members of staff to appear before the Committee (Peplow, 2011). Such witnesses have an 
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obligation to attend PAC meetings, provide the necessary information, and answer the 
questions of PAC members in a truthful manner and without concealing any relevant 
information (OECD, 2002).2 The PAC is also empowered to invite the Auditor General and 
staff members to attend its sittings, in order to assist and advise the PAC as required (Hedger 
and Blick, 2008; NAO, 2013). In Malta, the Committee’s hearings are publicly held and 
therefore accessible to the general public and the media; however, the latter’s coverage tends 
to suffer in relation to topics that are not of material public interest (OECD, 2002). Other 
participants at PAC discussions include the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry for 
Finance and the Office of the Prime Minister, or the Directors General representing them 
(Gauci Scicluna, 2004). 
After the sittings take place, the PAC is required to draft a report and present it to Parliament 
(GPG, 2013a). Governments are then obliged to respond to such reports (Wehner, 2002),3 
hence enabling the PAC to attain its mandate (Jacobs et al., 2007). 
2.2.1  The PAC’s Structure and Member Composition 
According to Johnston (2007), two crucial elements contributing to the PAC’s independence 
and operational effectiveness are its size and composition. 
As described by the OECD (2002), the size of the Committee is normally fixed by the SOs. 
Johnston (2007) argued that PACs should neither be too large, thus becoming unwieldy, nor 
too small, thus disrupting operations in cases of absences or vacancies. Generally, the size 
and structure of the PAC is a reflection of the country’s size (Jacobs et al., 2007). In fact, in a 
study carried out by the OECD (2002), the size of PACs across selected countries varied from 
seven to forty members, all of whom were Members of Parliament (MPs). In Commonwealth 
countries, PACs consisted of eleven members on average (Wehner, 2002). 
                                                          
2 In October 2011, the Maltese House of Representatives published a “Guide for Witnesses appearing 
before the PAC” 
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The composition of the PAC is a reflection of the political party proportions in Parliament, in 
this manner following the “principle of proportional representation” (OECD, 2002, p. 16). 
According to Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, and O’Brien (2012) this representation and the exclusion 
of Cabinet members from serving as PAC members are two factors contributing to PAC 
success. They argued that the mere presence of Cabinet members in the PAC hinders the 
Committee from operating impartially and without Government intrusion, possibly even 
slowing or distorting its investigations in order to defend the Cabinet’s position. The same 
argument was made by Cachia (2011) and Peplow (2011), with the latter observing that 
doubts regarding the potential conflicts of interest of Ministers or Shadow Ministers serving 
as members were raised during various Maltese PAC meetings. 
Typically, the PAC’s Chair is occupied by a member of the Opposition, with such custom being 
either an unwritten tradition or specified in Parliament’s rules (Wehner, 2002). This custom 
balances the power of the Government and the Opposition, and promotes the maintenance 
of a non-partisan spirit in the PAC’s operations (Stapenhurst et al., 2012). This ensures that 
the Committee’s objectivity is not undermined, and that hence no restrictions are placed on 
its scope (KPMG, 2006, as cited in Jacobs et al., 2007). In fact, it is considered by the OECD to 
be one of the factors that enhance the efficacy of PACs (2002). 
At the same time, however, the study by Pelizzo (2011) revealed that this practice does not 
necessarily improve the PAC’s activity and effectiveness. Rather, giving PAC Chairmanship 
to a Government member increases the accessibility of the Government and Ministers, and 
the implementation of the PAC’s recommendations (KPMG, 2006, as cited in Jacobs et al., 
2007). This is in fact the case in Australia (Stapenhurst et al., 2012), although it was not 
considered particularly successful by McGee (2002, as cited in Stapenhurst et al., 2012). 
As outlined earlier, the Maltese PAC’s structure and member composition are governed by 
SO 120E, which stipulates that the Committee shall be composed of seven members. PAC 
members shall be chosen by each side of the HoR to reflect “the proportion of Government 
and Opposition members” in Parliament (SOs of the HoR: Art. 120E, p. 23). Indeed, the PAC 
shall consist of four Government members and three Opposition members. The Leader of the 
Opposition shall nominate one of the Opposition members to occupy the Committee’s Chair. 
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The Chairperson shall not be equipped with a casting vote but with an original vote (SOs of 
the HoR: Art. 120E). 
The SOs also provide for the possibility of substitution of members, whereby the 
Committee’s members may be substituted following a notification to the Speaker of the HoR 
(SOs of the HoR: Art. 120B). Although this became common practice throughout the 
Committee’s lifetime (Peplow, 2011), its rationale and the potential conflicts of interest 
emerging from it were raised and questioned openly by a PAC member during a particular 
hearing (Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 2009). 
2.2.2  The PAC’s Technical Expertise 
As noted by Cachia and Baldacchino (2012), the Maltese PAC at the time was not adequately 
resourced in terms of administrative staff, with only one full-time staff member acting as the 
Committee’s clerk (Peplow, 2011). In addition, it was not supported on issues related to 
technical expertise, thus leaving it in the hands of PAC members to research the topics being 
tackled (Peplow, 2011). 
The problem of lack of resources and staff available at the PAC’s disposal is not limited to 
Malta, but was also recognised in many developing and developed countries (Hedger and 
Blick, 2008). Indeed, Hedger and Blick (2008) argued that while PACs require one full-time 
clerk and one or two experts as a minimum, not all PACs are equipped in this manner. 
This contrasts with the OECD’s report (2002), which concluded that when the need arose for 
technical or professional expertise, PACs could rely on their own advisors, or seek technical 
aid within the Parliamentary secretariat or even externally. The same study also revealed 
that it was common practice for the said Committees to have one person responsible for their 
administrative tasks, although having two or three persons was a rare exception. 
The implications associated with the PACs’ limited resources are widely recognised in 
different countries. In Australasia, this issue is impeding the Committees’ ability to 
commence investigations (Jacobs et al., 2007), while in the Commonwealth as a whole, it is 
affecting the report drafting process (Pelizzo, 2011). According to Wehner (2002), it may 
also place restrictions on the frequency of the PACs’ meetings, in spite of the fact that the 
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conduct of regular meetings is yet another aspect contributing to PAC effectiveness (Hedger 
and Blick, 2008). 
Furthermore, while the financial knowledge and skills of PAC members are a vital element 
contributing to the Committee’s effectiveness, such members are not normally selected on 
the basis of the said knowledge and skills, but as a result of certain political issues (Loney, 
2004). Indeed, Brazier and Ram (2006) and GPG (2014) argued that most MPs are not 
specialised in financial matters, and it is not reasonable to expect them to be. However, this 
lack of knowhow may ultimately weaken the Parliamentary and the PAC’s grip on public 
expenditure, particularly in view of increased complexity and commercialisation in the 
public sector (Jacobs, 2012). 
Consequently, the need for PACs to be provided with the necessary support is relevant for 
them to successfully perform their oversight and financial scrutiny functions (Brazier and 
Ram, 2006; GPG, 2014), as well as to enhance their overall role and efficacy (OECD, 2002). In 
fact, an inadequately resourced PAC tends to be unable to perform its functions satisfactorily, 
even if it is conceded all the appropriate powers (Loney, 2004). The provision of high-quality 
support enables PAC members to focus on significant issues meriting their attention, thereby 
saving time (NAO, 2011). As a result, Stapenhurst et al. (2005, p. 25) considered adequate 
resourcing as one of the main elements of an “ideal PAC”. 
The NAO (2011) outlined that, in addition to a Committee clerk and administrative support 
staff, United Kingdom (UK) PACs are also equipped with a Committee specialist, who is a 
permanent expert on the Committees’ work and affairs; and a special adviser, who is an 
expert called on ad hoc basis. Additional technical support can be obtained through seconded 
staff from bodies such as research institutions, universities, and SAIs (GPG, 2014), or through 
the establishment of a Parliamentary Scrutiny Unit (NAO, 2011), which was described as a 
“significant step forward” by Brazier and Ram (2006, p. 14). Further enhancement in the 
operational capacity of PACs can be carried out by means of capacity building and training 
for PAC members (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, CPA, 2006). 
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2.2.3 The PAC’s End Results 
Reporting 
As seen earlier, one of the major stages of a Committee enquiry involves the preparation of 
a report (GPG, 2014), which is considered to be the “principal output” of a Committee’s work 
(NAO, 2011, p. 34). Therefore the power to publish reports directly to Parliament is valued 
by most PACs, and is deemed necessary for such Committees to be effective (Stapenhurst et 
al., 2005; NAO, 2011). 
While many PACs draft a report at the end of each investigation – although some 
investigations may not be conclusive, others also prepare annual reports (Stapenhurst et al., 
2005). Commonly, PAC reports are based on the findings and recommendations of the 
reviewed NAO reports (OECD, 2002), drawing the Committee’s conclusions from the 
evidence gathered through its hearings (Yamamoto, 2007; NAO, 2011). Draft reports are 
debated within the Committee itself, allowing any necessary alterations to be put forward, 
carried out, or rejected before publication (Wehner, 2002). 
The OECD (2002) suggested that reports of PACs should be fair and impartial, outlining the 
positive areas while criticising those in need of improvement. Additionally, although the 
unanimous approval of the said reports among PAC members is not required, such 
consensus is still regarded as useful by a number of Committees (Wehner, 2002), and was 
therefore recommended as a good working practice by the OECD (2002). 
The prompt publication of PAC reports and minutes of sittings is favoured for the issues 
contained within to remain relevant and achieve instantaneous impact. Such reports can 
attract greater public attention if their publication is supplemented with a press release, thus 
enhancing media coverage (OECD, 2002). All in all, the preparation of understandable (NAO, 
2011) and “high-quality reports which secure public attention” improves the PAC’s 
credibility, in addition to supporting future operations (Hedger and Blick, 2008, p. 28). 
The situation in Malta probably differs from that described above. Indeed, in 2010, although 
empowered via the SOs to report to Parliament, the Maltese PAC did not prepare any reports, 
but simply published the transcripts and minutes of hearings (Peplow, 2011). Accordingly, 
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decisions based on the NAO’s output were merely suggested in sittings, with no formal 
resolutions being taken (OECD, 2002). 
Such a situation could be traced back to the lack of support available to the PAC (Peplow 
2011; Fenech, 2014). Indeed, Pelizzo (2011) found that in Commonwealth countries, the 
PAC’s ability to formulate reports is largely influenced by the size of the Committee’s staff. 
Recommendations 
According to the NAO (2011), the recommendations section of PAC reports is the part that 
mostly attracts the attention of Parliament, the Government, the public, and the media, hence 
making it the most significant. 
Although several PACs follow the Auditor General’s recommendations and reports in 
formulating their own (Stapenhurst et al., 2005), such Committees are considered more 
effective if granted with the power to make recommendations themselves (NAO, 2011). The 
OECD (2002) highlighted that for the implementation of such recommendations to increase, 
they must be constructive, progressive, and based on past cases. Moreover, the NAO (2011) 
emphasised that recommendations need to be specific and meaningful. Additionally, they 
should describe the corrective action to be taken together with the reasons behind such 
action, identify the person/s responsible for implementation, and issue respective deadlines. 
Follow-ups 
“The real test of the influence of the PAC is not simply whether its recommendations are 
accepted by Government but whether they are in fact implemented, effectively and in full.” 
(Brazier and Ram, 2006, p. 38) 
Indeed, as observed by Wehner (2002), PAC reports are only rendered useful if the matters 
and recommendations contained within are acted upon by their intended recipients. In a 
similar fashion, Stapenhurst et al. (2005) highlighted the significance of a systematic follow-
up process to ensure that the issues raised in PAC reports are addressed appropriately. 
Peplow (2011) concurred with this view, arguing that in many countries, procedures were 
devised to amplify the outcomes of PAC meetings and the Committee’s recommendations. 
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Indeed, several Commonwealth countries employ formal mechanisms that request the 
Government’s response to the PAC’s reports within a timeframe spanning from two to six 
months (Wehner, 2003). Such response is commonly referred to as the “Treasury Minute”, 
symbolising the fact that it is prepared by the Treasury (OECD, 2002). In this system, the 
reasons behind a rejected recommendation need to be explained, and it is then up to the PAC 
to decide whether to reconsider such issues (Wehner, 2003). 
Such mechanisms are regarded as valuable for the PAC to maintain its legitimacy while 
achieving accountability (Jacobs et al., 2007). This reflects the views of Hedger and Blick 
(2008, p. 28) who maintained that: 
“If a PAC is effective in ensuring the execution of money-saving recommendations, the value 
of such work will become more apparent and in turn easier to carry out and implement.” 
In fact, a report in 2002 stated that in the UK alone, more than 90% of PAC recommendations 
were accepted annually. This enabled savings of approximately £427 million a year, to be 
made from the combined work of the PAC and the NAO (OECD, 2002). 
Nonetheless, such systems are not always a satisfactory means of guaranteeing that 
recommendations are actually taken up, or that the responses provided are sufficient, in 
which case little can be done owing to Parliament’s inadequate resources (Wehner, 2002). 
Stapenhurst et al. (2012) upheld this view, arguing that such responses are typically evasive, 
and hence signifying insufficient implementation and action. On the other hand, Pelizzo 
(2011) found that while Governments tend to respond positively to PAC recommendations, 
the extent of legal modifications and action taken in response to such recommendations is 
insufficient. 
In most of the countries participating in the OECD’s study (2002), the PAC or the NAO, or 
even both, performed follow-ups through systems varying across different countries. 
Generally, some jurisdictions even extend their follow-up processes to “formal tracking 
reports”, whereby NAOs delve into the degree of implementation of PAC recommendations 
after a period of time (Wehner, 2003, p. 29). 
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2.3   Relationships of the PAC  with Major Stakeholders 
As stated by Peplow (2011), the PAC’s three major stakeholders are Parliament – the 
representative of the electorate; the Auditor General – the state auditor appointed by the 
Constitution of Malta; and the Executive – which is held accountable for its usage of public 
funds. The role of the Committee is, in fact, that of an audit committee bringing them 
together. 
For this reason, this section reviews the literature regarding these three relationships in 
three sub-sections. Sub-section 2.3.1 focuses on the PAC’s relationship with the SAI, while 
Sub-section 2.3.2 describes the relationship between the Committee and Parliament. Finally, 
Sub-section 2.4.3 gives an overview of the PAC’s relationship with the Executive. 
2.3.1  Relationship with the SAI 
In the Westminster system, the relationship between the PAC and the SAI is based on “mutual 
dependency” (Wehner, 2003, p. 27), indicating that the achievement of systematic 
accountability rests upon the intertwined operations of both (Jones and Jacobs, 2006). 
Indeed, the PAC tends to be the “primary audience” of the Auditor General (Wehner, 2002, 
p. 4), since in its course of work, the former is principally concerned with investigating 
reports and any related documents issued by the latter (Watson, 2004; NAO, 2013). At the 
same time, the Auditor General relies on the PAC for its findings and recommendations to 
receive the appropriate attention (NAO, 2013), and for the Government to be pressured into 
taking timely remedial action (OECD, 2002; Hedger and Blick, 2008). 
Therefore, the Committee proves to be a way of bolstering the SAI’s effectiveness (McGee, 
2002, as cited in Jacobs et al., 2007). Similarly, upholding a constructive and active 
relationship with the SAI ensures that the PAC functions effectively (NAO, 2011), since the 
support and contribution of a robust SAI are a sine qua non for the PAC to attain success 
(Fenech, 2014). In this context, the importance for the said relationship to be of “quality and 
substance” cannot be overemphasised (Hedger and Blick, 2008, p. 32). 
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According to the OECD (2002), maintaining a fruitful working relationship between the two 
parties requires a two-way collaboration and cooperation on issues of mutual interest and 
agreement. While this is beneficial and necessitates both bodies to alter their work priorities, 
it is essential that a degree of independence is still kept (Hedger and Blick, 2008). Therefore, 
it is desirable for such rapport to be protected legally (Loney, 2004), in this way ensuring 
that interactions between the PAC and the SAI are clearly delineated and established in a 
coherent manner (OECD, 2002). 
Hedger and Blick (2008) put forward a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening 
this relationship. These included increased support by the SAI to the PAC, for example by 
providing assistance and training to PAC members and staff; and the adoption of long-term 
and strategic approaches, such as the development of codes of conduct. 
2.3.2 Relationship with Parliament 
PCs such as the PAC are established in order to carry out tasks on Parliament’s behalf. These 
tasks generally involve scrutiny and oversight functions, and the preparation of information 
enabling informed decisions to be made during plenary sessions (GPG, 2013b). 
In effect, PCs can carry out their functions through the powers conferred to them by 
Parliament (GPG, 2013a). In this context, variations arise across countries in regard to the 
amount of powers delegated. A number of Parliaments worldwide grant normal powers, 
retaining other powers within their own structure; while others transfer higher levels of 
autonomy to PACs (GPG, 2013b). 
As noted earlier, as part of the typical powers delegated, PACs are to formulate reports about 
their operations, table them in Parliament (GPG, 2013a), and request a Parliamentary debate 
to be held on such reports (Stapenhurst et al., 2005). Such form of debate is considered 
fundamental for the “circle of accountability” to be completed (OECD, 2002, p. 44), thus 
making it one of the factors contributing to the “ideal PAC” as envisaged by Stapenhurst et 
al. (2005, p. 25). In the UK, such debates are held on an annual basis (OECD, 2002). 
In addition, PCs are where Parliament’s “real work is done” (GPG, 2013b, p. 5), thus signifying 
the importance of providing them with budgets that are part of Parliament’s appropriation 
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(Loney, 2004). Indeed, it is recommended that Parliaments provide more administrative and 
technical resources to such Committees in order to curb corruption (GPG, 2014), and to 
ultimately make “the Government a better servant of the people” (Smith, 2014, p. 5). 
2.3.3  Relationship with the Executive 
One of the essential functions of Parliament and the PAC is “to oversee the Executive, to 
monitor its performance and to hold it accountable for its actions” (GPG, 2013a, p. 7). In this 
regard, Jacobs et al. (2007, p. 29) stressed that the PAC is the only committee with a 
“Government-wide responsibility”. 
According to Smith (2014), such Committees should strive to challenge the Executive in a 
constructive manner, so that results are delivered for the electorate, in spite of the possibility 
that the Committees’ relationships with Ministers may be impaired. At the same time, an 
effective relationship can still be maintained if Committees also highlight good practices in 
addition to failures or weaknesses. Although it may be true that an effective relationship 
rests on the “attitudes and behaviour” of Committee members and Ministers, codifying such 
relationships in Ministers’ codes may still prove to be useful (Smith, 2014, p. 1). According 
to Loney (2004), PACs should strive to treat Ministers fairly, in this way enabling a 
cooperative relationship to be established with them. 
On the other hand, Wehner (2002) argued that the PAC normally summons highly ranked 
Public Officials as opposed to Ministers, who are the political Heads of Departments. As seen 
earlier, this reflects the policy neutrality principle, requiring the PAC not to delve into 
political and policy matters, but to scrutinise their underlying expenditure. Indeed, in Malta 
it is common practice for Permanent Secretaries or similar officials to be summoned and to 
therefore be held accountable (OECD, 2002). 
3   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This article is based on research carried out in Malta in 2014/2015 to analyse the role and 
effectiveness of the Maltese PAC in public accountability.   
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The research methodology employed was twofold: first, nineteen semi-structured 
interviews with PAC Representatives, NAO Officers, Public Officials, and journalists were 
conducted. Interviews were held face to face between October 2014 and March 2015 at the 
interviewees’ offices, their duration ranging from half an hour to one hour and a quarter. 
Open-ended questions were analyzed in detail, so that common issues and any 
dissimilarities emerging from the interviews could be identified and then grouped. Close-
ended questions were analyzed statistically using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS).  
 Secondly,  responses to these interviews were backed or otherwise by a separate review of 
relevant PAC transcripts, an analysis of the relevant legislation regulating the PAC, and 
attendance to a PAC meeting in early 2015. 
4   FINDINGS & DISCUSSION 
Research  findings will now be presented in three sections: the roles of the PAC and its 
related parties, PAC barriers to operational effectiveness, and the PAC's relationships with 
its major stakeholders. 
4.1 The Roles of the PAC and its Related Parties 
Following the route towards public accountability requires a deep understanding of the 
parameters within which the related parties can operate. As shown in Figure 2, this route 
involves a tripartite relationship and requires a clear delineation of each party’s roles. In 
order to ensure that public accountability is effective, all parties need to keep within their 
own parameters and understand those of the others. 
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In the Maltese scenario, the route of the PAC is established in its legal mandate, which sets 
out the Committee’s roles with respect to the boundaries within which the PAC is to operate, 
and the links that are to be made with the other parties in this tripartite relationship. 
In turn, the PAC acknowledges its responsibility in observing this statute and, generally, it 
does make an effort to carry out the mentioned roles. In fact, the Committee’s level of 
scrutiny improved in the last decade, leaving a positive mark on Maltese public finance and 
on the various spheres of public accountability. In connection with this, Peplow (2011) 
claimed that in recent years the PAC enhanced public governance, and contributed to an 
overhaul in the state and internal audit functions, among others. As stated in the literature, 
enhancement is also continuously being carried out by legislators, the last example of which 
was the Fiscal Responsibility Act (Cap. 534), enacted in 2014. 
However, a thorough analysis of the work undertaken by the PAC reveals the Committee’s 
tendency to disregard some of its roles for the sake of carrying out other specific roles. In 
fact, while the PAC carries out work on its own initiative or on that of the NAO, it tends to 
either omit from examination or examine cursorily more routine work, such as the enquiry 
into “expenditure as is referred to in Articles 103(3) and 104 of the Constitution”, as per its 
mandate (SOs of the HoR: Art. 120E, p. 23). 
Figure 1 - A Tripartite Relationship towards Public Accountability 
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Furthermore, the PAC does not formally communicate its findings to Parliament, although 
the minutes of its proceedings are made available. Such omission possibly spoils its end 
product, as it does not completely close the loop of public accountability. 
One might argue that the PAC’s almost exclusive focus on the NAO’s output is due to its 
limited resources, in terms of time and administrative support, to cover every area within its 
mandate. Such circumstances are probably limiting the Committee to the discussion of issues 
that have already been subjected to the NAO’s investigations, which thus enables the former 
to save time and effort in obtaining the necessary foundations on which to base its 
discussions. In the same vein, GPG (2014) emphasised that the worldwide establishment of 
priorities is necessary, owing to the Committees’ limited resources. 
However, one might present a different argument as regards this state of affairs. In recent 
years, the PAC has directed its attention almost exclusively to controversial issues, too often 
at the expense of important though low profile matters. This may indicate that, in reality, the 
PAC tends to seek the public spotlight in order to achieve a positive public image. Ironically, 
the media may be assisting the PAC in this regard, since it also tends to concentrate on high 
profile and popular topics. Indeed, as pointed out by the OECD (2002, p. 19), the level of 
media coverage differs with the “relevance of topics” as perceived by the public at large. 
At present, the existence of the PAC in itself constitutes a solid ground for increasing the 
responsibility of Public Officials. Yet the biased coverage of the PAC could possibly lead to 
the auditees becoming rather indifferent to the PAC’s scrutiny. This may easily occur upon 
the realisation that the PAC may be more interested in the pursuit of its members’ political 
agendas, rather than in the full discharge of financial scrutiny and public accountability. 
Ultimately, one might question whether the PAC is actually making the best use of the powers 
granted to it via its legal mandate to carry out what it was established to do in the first place. 
Instead of being an “avenue to public accountability” (Cachia and Baldacchino, 2012, p. 29) 
as per its mandate, the PAC may actually be deluding itself with its scope limitations. 
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4.2   Barriers To Operational Effectiveness 
Figure 3  shows that the PAC’s road to operational effectiveness is obstructed by four 
different barriers mandate issues, structure and member composition issues, technical 
issues and communication issues.  Each  of these barrier will now be dealt with.  
 
 
 4.2.1 Examining the PAC’s Mandate 
As noted earlier, the PAC’s duties emanate from SO 120E, which provides for a formal list of 
powers enabling the Committee to contribute effectively to public accountability. However, 
the adequacy of this mandate and its powers is still open to question. 
Probably the PAC needs to widen its remit to encompass further topics. At present there are 
various financial and strategic issues that are being left unexplored, and these are not merely 
restricted to the above-mentioned routine matters. These include, for example, the 
implementation of new developments and regulations imposed by the EU Commission, as 
well as the implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism by local regulators. In this 
context, the legal mandate might be broadened in order to place emphasis on such or similar 
Figure 2 - Major Barriers to Operational Effectiveness 
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exigencies, besides obliging the Committee to look carefully into all routine matters. In this 
regard, Stapenhurst et al. (2005) argued that a broad mandate increases the Committee’s 
ability to prevent misconduct while inducing good administration of public funds. 
However, such a broader mandate may convey its own dangers, as it may involve a higher 
level of discretion with respect to a wider span of topics. This tends to involve the Committee 
in even more political controversies than it is associated with at present. Perhaps a 
prioritisation exercise addressing the remit of the PAC should best be set annually by 
Parliament. One might argue that such a broader mandate, if introduced, should be 
accompanied by the allocation of more resources to the Committee than it currently has. 
Furthermore, such a broadened portfolio would need to take into account those of other 
watchdogs, to ensure that there is no overlapping of material. This includes the portfolio 
directly taken up by Parliament itself as well as those of other Parliamentary Standing 
Committees. An example is the portfolio of the Standing Committee of Economic and 
Financial Affairs (SCEFA), which includes under its remit the financial and economic 
considerations of “any decision, recommendation, or report published locally, by the 
European Institutions or by international organisations, that could have an impact on the 
Maltese economy” (SOs of the HoR: Art. 120I, p. 25). However, the operations of the SCEFA 
go beyond the scope of this study and may entail further research. 
Furthermore, the present or widened remit of the PAC must be made clearer to all 
stakeholders. This becomes evident upon analysing the suggestions of some respondents to 
include, as new topics to be considered, ones which are already within the present remit, 
such as issues concerning privatisation. Unfortunately, little progress may be registered with 
regard to these blurred ideas relating to the PAC’s current portfolio, if this issue is not 
appropriately addressed. 
Finally, even if the prioritisation of topics to be considered is left in the hands of the PAC 
itself, it must be ensured that such an exercise is based on the best interests of the public. 
This is admittedly a difficult job to implement without the input of the NAO itself or of other 
technical experts. 
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 4.2.2 Questioning the PAC’s Structure and Member Composition 
Typically, the PAC is structured in the same manner as in most other Parliaments (Wehner, 
2002). As stated in the literature, the Maltese PAC is made up of seven members, four of 
which representing the Government and three the Opposition. However, while this structure 
seeks to achieve a balance between the political parties, it is not necessarily optimal. Clearly, 
this equilibrium spurs each side on to defend its political turf. Indeed, Peplow (2011) found 
that each party was inclined to assume its expected questioning or defensive stand, and there 
is no reason to believe why this has changed. 
In addition, the fact that one finds Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, as well as their 
Shadows, sitting among such members only exasperates the situation. Their presence 
renders discussions difficult to be maintained at a technical level, and raises doubts as to 
whether any statements are truly being forwarded solely with a view to bringing about 
improvements. This argument is in line with Stapenhurst et al. (2012). While the presence 
of political persons who matter and are knowledgeable might be essential, the question of 
whether they need to be members still remains. Furthermore, one might ask: wouldn’t their 
participation in the discussion, when called on for this purpose by the Committee, be 
enough? 
The same doubts were shared by Cachia (2011), who argued that the current structure might 
result in conflicts of interest, with the more prominent members scrutinising the outcomes 
of their own doings. Surely, out of sixty-nine MPs, there must be other Parliamentarians who 
are perceived to be both competent and more independent for adequate membership into 
this Committee. 
Even without going to the full extent of excluding from PAC membership frontbenchers who 
may be perceived to have common conflicts of interest, one could at least exclude such 
persons from discussing topics falling directly within their portfolio. The relevant member 
might be sent out and asked to comment only when questioned. This could be an interim 
solution until more care is exercised with regard to the appointment of members. 
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For the sake of maintaining balance between relevance and objectivity of the PAC 
discussions, the membership of both front liners and backbenchers may be opted for. 
However, having a PAC member composition of solely backbenchers, with the participation 
of front liners upon the request of the PAC members as and when necessary, is probably a 
better way of ensuring fewer conflicts of interest and a higher level of initiative without 
sacrificing the relevance of the discussion. A relevant point that could be made here is that 
once the Permanent Secretary – or a similar officer of the respective department – is required 
to attend and to forward their perspectives without fear or favour, the need to call for the 
front liners themselves might rarely arise. At the moment, such officers are merely being 
invited to attend (OECD, 2002). 
All in all, independence in fact – rather than in appearance – mostly depends on the 
characters and personalities involved. Therefore, while it is helpful to alter the structure as 
stated above, given that independence in appearance can in itself endanger public trust, 
there is more that needs to be done. The criteria for the selection of PAC members should go 
beyond the above stated position which they occupy in Parliament, and include their level of 
financial and administrative expertise, as well as their standing within the financial 
community. 
Again, admittedly, the choice being made on such criteria may end up becoming a sensitive 
issue if such a choice is left to each side of Parliament itself. Probably the aid of experts such 
as the NAO and the Ombudsman might be of help in this regard. 
4.2.3 Availability of Technical Expertise  
How can one go about assessing the PAC’s effectiveness without considering any skill gaps 
harboured by such Committee? Indeed, Loney (2004, p. 4) argued that the “competence and 
skills” of the members making up the PAC are two critical factors contributing to the 
Committee’s effectiveness. 
This issue is particularly true in the Maltese scenario. At times, in spite of any effort that 
might be made to choose the most appropriate Parliamentarians, it remains difficult to 
appoint members with a sufficiently high level of financial expertise. This may be because 
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the political career tends to be more attractive to individuals engaged in the legal profession, 
resulting in a substantial amount of MPs being lawyers by profession. Thus the PAC might 
easily end up having more lawyers than it should. Of course, one could argue that lawyers 
have a particular frame of mind that proves to be very useful in PAC sittings, as it leads to 
pertinent questions being asked to the witnesses appearing before them. At the same time, 
however, these professionals might easily lack the necessary financial knowhow, reducing 
the effectiveness of the discussions as a result. 
To make matters worse, some PAC members may prove themselves to be too busy to prepare 
adequately for PAC sittings, although such preparation was identified by GPG (2014) as being 
a fundamental factor for effective scrutiny. This claim was further supported by Smith (2014, 
p. 3), who argued that PAC members need to do their “homework” so as to maximise the 
value derived from the testimonies given by the summoned officials. 
Although this may be true, one might argue that NAO reports – which make up most of the 
PAC’s agenda – are too voluminous, and PAC members lack the time to read or at least go 
through them. Indeed, a study by Cachia (2011, p. 69) concluded that the said reports may 
fail to specify the “most material issues” for the PAC to direct its attention to them. This 
situation probably still prevails, regardless of the fact that the NAO’s assistance has been 
found to be constantly available to the Committee in this context. 
All this might imply that the assistance provided by the NAO is not enough to meet the PAC’s 
requirements, and that further expertise may need to be sought. In this regard, the issue is 
not deciding whether the PAC uses its own experts or the NAO’s experts, as argued by 
respondents. Rather, what truly matters is that such specialists are available to the PAC 
during its sittings. Otherwise some experts might not be present for the sitting itself, but 
remain on call in case they are needed. 
Of course, the question remains who is to decide which experts are to participate, and/or 
which are to remain on call for each particular sitting. Probably this is the domain of the 
Auditor General, who may consult as necessary with the members of the Committee on to 
how to proceed with respect to the participation of expertise in the following sitting. 
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At times experts may be directly engaged by the PAC, particularly where the experts 
provided by the NAO have already been involved in consultancy with the NAO that could be 
perceived as compromising. However, such direct engagement should probably be an 
exception rather than the rule, as the process of the PAC directly appointing experts might 
prove to be difficult and even controversial. 
Furthermore, given the small size of the country, there may be a problem with following in 
the UK’s footsteps of establishing a Scrutiny Unit, composed of specialists in various fields, 
that would sustain all PCs including the PAC. Although, as identified by Stapenhurst et al. 
(2005) and the NAO (2011), the availability of adequate support is one of the factors 
contributing to PAC effectiveness, the duplication of experts at Parliament level might be 
viewed to be unduly onerous on the public purse, barring exceptional circumstances. 
4.2.4 Enhancing Communication: Formalizing the PAC’s End Product 
The whole exercise of financial oversight does not come to an end once PAC meetings take 
place. On the contrary, these discussions simply lead the way towards another essential 
phase of the process, which is the formulation of the end results. Although this may be the 
most important stage of a PAC’s enquiry for its work to remain relevant, it is too often 
completely overlooked by the Maltese PAC. 
Reporting 
As stated in the literature, a typical PAC investigation includes the drafting and publication 
of a report, in addition to outlining the major findings and other relevant matters. However, 
as briefly discussed in Section 4.1, the Maltese PAC fails to publish such reports. 
One might argue that this comes as no surprise, owing to the lack of resources that is evident 
in all the other PCs within Maltese Parliament. At the same time, one could counter-argue 
that, in spite of this problem, a number of Committees still publish reports, whether regularly 
or occasionally. Once again, this might possibly imply that the commitment of PAC members 
towards the Committee has traditionally been somewhat weak. In fact, research findings 
show that even at present, four of the five respondents against the need for reports were PAC 
members. 
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The PAC’s current working practice of issuing transcripts and minutes of meetings is in itself 
beneficial, symbolising transparency in its procedures. However, issuing reports on the 
different topics is probably much more user-friendly and less cumbersome than pouring 
through the minutes, even if these are optimally constructed and cross-referenced. The 
major problem of transcripts and minutes is that it may ultimately not be worthwhile for 
interested persons, except perhaps for investigative journalists, to look into the proceedings 
of any topic from meeting to meeting. As seen earlier, Hedger and Blick (2008) and the NAO 
(2011) highlighted the significance of PAC reports and their understandability for the overall 
effectiveness of the PAC. 
Therefore, transcripts and minutes are probably to be mostly retained as evidence behind 
the reasoning and conclusions in the reports, which will refer to them as necessary. 
PAC  Recommendations 
Through its recommendations, the PAC can “achieve real impact and change” (NAO, 2011, p. 
35). Yet, as stated earlier, these seem to be completely missing from the current system, at 
least in a formalised manner. Without due formalisation, such recommendations can rarely 
be communicated clearly to their intended recipients such as Public Officials; and this 
reduces the possibility of their implementation. 
Furthermore, formalising recommendations as an essential part of written reporting will, 
over a number of years, create generally accepted practices and points of reference for the 
reference of Public Officials. In this context, one can emulate the UK’s PAC recommendations, 
which have, with time, led this country to specialise in certain spheres and to publicise good 
customs (OECD, 2002). 
Additionally, the mere fact that recommendations are written will prevent officers making 
the same mistakes by learning from past history and individual cases. It is also far easier for 
the public to exercise pressure towards improvement if such reports, in addition to the 
minutes and transcripts themselves, are readily available on the internet. 
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Perhaps, in order to give more weight to such recommendations, it would be best if they are 
made periodically to Parliament itself, which would thus give them the statutory force and 
empowerment of the latter institution. 
Follow-Ups 
The need and benefits associated with a structured system of follow-ups are widely 
recognised in the literature. Such a system is, however, closely linked to the Committee’s 
ability to publish reports and recommendations (Stapenhurst et al., 2005), its significance 
being enhanced when the said reports outline cases of “corruption or impropriety or serious 
maladministration” (GPG, 2014, p. 4). 
In the Maltese context given the absence of formalised reporting in the first instance, there 
is of course no formalised follow-up by the PAC as yet. However, a situation in which Public 
Officials have to face a formalised system of feedback will surely promote more remedial 
action to be taken in time. Therefore, given the certainty of follow-ups within a reasonable 
time, the work of the PAC becomes much more effective. 
For the follow-up system to be successful, the monitoring of the recommendations of the 
Committee may be made either by the NAO itself or by the Internal Audit and Investigations 
Department (IAID). If such monitoring is carried out by the IAID, it would also keep the NAO 
periodically informed about the progress being made. Reports may be passed on to the PAC 
either directly by the IAID or through the NAO. Further contributions might be made by the 
IAID to the PAC. However, this goes beyond the scope of this dissertation, and further studies 
may be required in this aspect. 
4.3  The PAC’s Relationships with its Major Stakeholders 
This section analyses the PAC’s relationships with its major stakeholders. 
4.3.1 The Relationship with the NAO: A Tool to Reach the Other Parties 
Jacobs et al. (2007) emphasised the importance of maintaining a strong relationship between 
the PAC and the SAI. In Malta an effective relationship exists between these two institutions, 
as the NAO’s impartial and autonomous reports are sine qua non for PAC effectiveness 
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(Fenech, 2014). However, an effective relationship does not necessarily signify that further 
progress may not be achieved, or that shortcomings are inexistent. In fact, in spite of the 
effective link between the PAC and the NAO, the PAC’s perception of the Office may be subject 
to discussion. 
On the one hand, one might argue that the PAC considers the NAO as its agent. While the PAC 
recognises the importance of the NAO in its operations, its expectations of the Office may 
sometimes be unrealistic. Perhaps the PAC tends to over-exercise its power in requesting the 
Auditor General to undertake special exercises such as investigations. Indeed, Peplow (2011, 
p. 24) argued that the PAC was “unnecessarily stretching” the NAO’s resources “to 
accommodate the PAC’s requests”. Such a situation may impede the Office from fulfilling its 
routine obligations. 
Although this argument may be true, one might counter-argue that the NAO is legally bound 
to attend to all the PAC’s requirements and supply it with the necessary information; and 
that it is therefore expected to make an effort to do so since, ultimately, the NAO’s output is 
for the benefit of the PAC (Cachia, 2011). 
At the same time, the Auditor General is one of Parliament’s independent officers, and is also 
required to present the NAO’s work to the Speaker, for such work to be then tabled in 
Parliament (Farrugia, 2014). This also makes the NAO directly answerable to Parliament, 
thus highlighting the need for the PAC to acknowledge that the NAO is not merely its own 
agent, but of Parliament and the public as a whole. 
Furthermore, while the PAC may be overburdening the NAO with its requests, the 
Committee’s perception and use of the NAO’s investigations raise yet another debatable 
issue. On the one hand, the reports issued by the NAO are being put to good use by the PAC. 
Most PAC hearings rely on the said reports, thus making the NAO the key information 
provider of the PAC. However, the suggestion of some respondents that the PAC should also 
consider other sources of information beyond the NAO’s work harbours doubts on whether 
the PAC makes optimal use of the NAO’s audits. 
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Needless to say, one might argue that acquiring information from a wide variety of sources 
has the advantage of considering different perspectives and of looking at the wider picture. 
Indeed, GPG (2013a) outlined that the PAC’s evidence gathering stage should include a broad 
range of sources. 
Yet it is reasonable to counter-argue that this makes more sense in instances when the PAC 
discusses matters, on its own initiative, for which no NAO investigation has yet been 
undertaken. Seeking additional information about topics that have already been subjected 
to the NAO’s investigation implies that the Committee questions the reliability of such 
investigations, and may even necessitate repeating some of the audit procedures for the 
reduction or elimination of doubts. If such an attitude is commonly adopted, the NAO ends 
up as merely another department to be checked, and the PAC ends up overlapping the duties 
of the auditor who is selected by the National Audit Office Accounts Committee (NAOAC) for 
the purposes of auditing the NAO.4 While the PAC might furnish the private auditor with 
valuable insights on public sector matters, this issue is still an unexplored area. 
The way forward for the relationship of the PAC with the NAO is best built upon mutual trust 
and commitment. While the NAO continues to feed the PAC with information, advice, and 
expertise, the PAC will not normally doubt the NAO’s audit methodologies, although it may 
request to be informed about them. On the other hand, if in the operational stages of its 
investigations the NAO encounters major difficulties, it might be better for such issues to be 
brought to the PAC’s immediate attention. Overall, the PAC’s best use of the NAO would be 
as a tool for reaching and accessing other parties. In this manner, both the remits of the NAO 
and the PAC would be more effective. 
4.3.2 The Relationship with Parliament: A Principal-Agent Relationship 
With the PAC being one of Parliament’s Standing Committees, its relationship with 
Parliament is that of an agent working on behalf of the principal in order to facilitate its work 
(GPG, 2013b). It is therefore reasonable to expect that the PAC will report back to Parliament, 
                                                          
4 The establishment of the NAOAC and the powers granted to it emanate from the Auditor General and 
National Audit Office Act (Cap. 396). 
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as stated earlier. Furthermore, it is also reasonable to assume that Parliament will oversee 
the PAC’s efforts and regularly provide its own feedback to the Committee. 
However, as has been seen, there is no formal reporting back to Parliament by the PAC, and 
no feedback by Parliament to the PAC regarding its reactions. The mutual relationship is 
therefore obstructed from both ends. An agency problem can thus arise wherein PAC 
members choose to pursue their own agenda, which is not necessarily in alignment with that 
of Parliament. 
The need that was recognised by respondents for the PAC to be equipped with executive 
powers may have been expressed in reaction to this obstructed principal-agent relationship 
and the outcome of the agency problem. The PAC may utilise such powers, if these are 
conceded to it, to carry out its own intentions and plans. Although the granting of such 
executive powers may be common in some Parliaments (GPG, 2013b), one possible 
implication behind this is the transfer of greater autonomy to the Committee, possibly 
leading to its further distancing from Parliament. 
At the same time, the ability of Parliament to go into PAC matters depends largely on the 
PAC’s communication with it. Once the PAC does not provide sufficient information about its 
proceedings and recommendations, Parliament does not have a solid base for monitoring it 
and passing any necessary resolutions. In effect, both entities need each other for the sake of 
public accountability. As stated earlier, this necessitates a total revamp in their mutual 
communication. 
4.3.3 The Relationship with the Executive: The PAC as a Catalyst of Change for the 
Executive 
As stated in the literature, the PAC was primarily established to oversee and scrutinise the 
Government’s use of public funds as well as to strengthen the NAO’s role. In fact, the joint 
effort of the PAC and the NAO creates a public accountability mechanism that holds the 
Executive to account “through Parliament to the citizen” (Jones and Jacobs, 2006, p. 72). The 
NAO plays a vital role in this mechanism, as it carries out both compliance and VFM audits 
on Government operations (OECD, 2002; Cachia, 2011). 
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Therefore, one might argue that since the Executive’s work is subject to the NAO’s thorough 
analysis, it is more important for the Executive to maintain a cordial relationship with the 
NAO rather than with the PAC. However, given that a major part of the PAC’s workload 
involves the detailed examination of the NAO’s reports, and that the PAC is empowered to 
summon witnesses, the maintenance of an effective relationship with the PAC is also 
relevant. 
The Committee, however, is deemed to be superior to the Executive, possibly because it is an 
“integral part of a democratic system” and a chief instrument overseeing the Executive 
(Johnston, 2007, p. 20). Thus, in reality, the Executive is obliged to be answerable to the 
Committee. Consequently, the only relationship that exists between the Executive and the 
PAC is a vertical one-way relationship that places the PAC over the Executive, resulting in 
predictable awe by the Executive towards the PAC. 
Although this kind of relationship may still prove to be effective, it could be strengthened 
further if the Executive has a clearer understanding of the PAC’s role in public accountability. 
The Executive probably needs to be made more aware that the PAC’s duty is not to “give a 
beating” to the Public Officials summoned before it, but to draw their attention to certain 
weaknesses and instigate them to act upon and eliminate them. Probably even more needs 
to be done in order for the Committee to clearly appear as the catalyst of progress in the eyes 
of the Executive. Additionally, the PAC must be seen as the vehicle through which the public 
ensures that ultimate accountability is in place, and that public services are functioning 
according to the public’s expectations. 
Of course, this entails an effort to be made by the Committee itself. In this respect, GPG (2014, 
p. 4) suggested that committees engaged in financial scrutiny must regard the Executive as 
their “critical friend”. While the PAC is still expected to vigorously carry out its scrutinising 
function, it also needs to emphasise “dialogue and constructive working relationships with 
the Executive”. Having said this, the issues that are at present hindering communication and 
mutual understanding between the PAC and the Executive may necessitate further research. 
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5  CONCLUSION 
This study concludes that the PAC is instrumental in the conduct of effective financial 
scrutiny and oversight, which in turn enhances its contribution to the proper management 
of Maltese public finances. Yet, achieving a strong impact may be restricted by the existence 
of barriers that are impeding the Committee’s operational effectiveness. While the 
surmounting of such obstacles becomes highly relevant for the PAC to retain its watchdog 
function, the maintenance of effective relationships with its main stakeholders is also 
necessary if it is to make the most of such links. Ultimately, the PAC should have as its 
primary aim the proper discharge of public accountability. 
This study was subject to a number of limitations. Some respondents did not answer all 
questions posed to them, declaring that they were not in a position to provide a response. 
On other occasions, some respondents failed to provide a satisfactory minimum level of 
detail in their responses. Furthermore, some other responses were clearly irrelevant, and 
therefore had to be omitted from the research finding. 
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